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 AN INTERVIEW WITH CASPAR BOWDEN 
 
Caspar Bowden (cb@fipr.org) is the author of a recent DLTR article, 
Closed Circuit Television for Inside Your Head: Blanket Traffic Data 
Retention and the Emergency Anti-Terrorism Legislation.  He is the 
Director of the Foundation for Information Policy Research 
(http://www.fipr.org), an independent non-profit think-tank that 
undertakes research on the interaction between information technology 
and society, technical developments with significant social impact, and 
public policy alternatives.  He was formerly a consultant specializing in 
Internet security and e-commerce, senior researcher of an option-
arbitrage trading firm, a financial strategist with Goldman Sachs, and 
chief algorithm designer for a virtual reality software house.  We 
interviewed Mr. Bowden about combating terrorism in Europe and other 
issues related to European cyber-policy, such as the success of a 




You argue in your article, Closed Circuit Television For Inside Your Head, that the UK’s 
anti-terrorism legislation may harm the security, privacy, and freedom of expression of law-
abiding citizens and that it will likely be ineffective in detecting or deterring terrorist 
communications.  How would you modify the UK’s legislative framework to increase the 
likelihood of its effectiveness and lessen the potential for civil liberties abuses?   
 
The basic argument is whether machinery to put the entire population under 
computerized surveillance is compatible with human rights in a democratic society, and also 
whether such measures are likely to be effective in stopping terrorism, which together with drug 
trafficking, money laundering and child pornography, is the most often cited justification. 
 
The argument is very complex, involving the arcane concept of "steganography" (information 
hiding), but overall takes the form of a reductio ad absurdum.  The unpalatable truth is that both 
terrorist command structures and operational cells can use practical and effective communications 
tradecraft to elude detection altogether, even if the resources hitherto employed by the National 
Security Agency (NSA) against external enemies were turned inward.  There is thus no point in 
proceeding down that path to protect against terrorism, although such capabilities could be 
profoundly dangerous to democratic society in other ways. 
 An alternative approach, which is by no means a perfect substitute for the illusory omniscience 
sought by the authorities, is to by-pass encryption and other security measures by developing 
sophisticated software viruses, used in conjunction with robust traditional methods of covert 
search and entry and installation of physical devices such as keystroke loggers.  
 
Unlike blanket retention of traffic data (or the discredited idea of key-escrow), these techniques at 
least stand a chance of working effectively, where the target's platform can be identified or 
reached indirectly.  They are also preferable from the civil liberties point of view, because there is 
an intrinsic incentive to minimize their deployment to reduce the risk of compromise.  In the US, 
the application of existing law to key-logging was recently tested in the "Scarfo" case,1 but 
important questions remain on whether targets have a constitutional right to be notified 
eventually.  
 
The UK has no legislation explicitly addressing use of these techniques, although existing powers 
governing microphone bugs could be shoe-horned to fit.  However, these techniques will need 
oversight and supervision of unprecedented stringency, because false evidence could easily be 
concocted, and arguably they should thus only be used for gathering intelligence.  The legalistic 
UK oversight regime is a "concrete lifejacket" - the deliberately vague formalities could all be 
adhered to, but flagrant and massive abuse could still disappear without trace. 
 
Therefore FIPR is far from endorsing such an approach, because oversight mechanisms are so 
deficient, nevertheless we did predict some years ago that capabilities such as the FBI's "Magic 
Lantern" would surely be developed. 
 
Is the UK approach to combating terrorism similar or dissimilar to the approach being 
taken in the US?  Is the US approach any better?   
 
Since WW2, there has been extremely close intelligence sharing of communications 
surveillance for national security.  The main difference is that there are categorical safeguards for 
US citizens, whereas UK legislation provides nothing comparable for British subjects.  Under the 
USA/PATRIOT Act which was rushed through with cursory debate after 9/11, the NSA is 
empowered to trawl through domestic communications for much broader purposes than before.  
                                                     
1 U.S. v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572 (D.N.J. 2001). 
The RIP Act 2000 had already given even more drastic powers to GCHQ, the UK equivalent to 
NSA about one seventh the size, but it is some way from having the technical capability or 
carrier's co-operation for implementation.  It can be read as a 10-year plan for a domestic 
surveillance infrastructure that can hunt for targets dynamically rather than a capability to trawl 
everything simultaneously. 
 
The UK passed further draconian "anti-terrorist" legislation following 9/11, but which is equally 
applicable to minor crimes.  The most disturbing aspect is a philosophical shift which has been 
virtually unreported, dubbed the "M&M-principle".  Previous anti-terrorist legislation, for 
example dealing with Northern Ireland, has defined especially severe powers for especially 
severe crimes.  However the UK government now literally says that since investigating theft of a 
bag of M&Ms *might* lead to uncovering an al Qaeda terrorist cell, even the most extreme 
powers must be available to pursue the most minor crimes.  They say matching personal details 
from separate databases will not be used for “fishing expeditions”, but in the same breath argue 
they must be allowed to piece together a “jigsaw” – a distinction without a difference in a 
computer context.  At the same time, it likes to claim that these powers are fully conformant with 
human rights, since they must implicitly be exercised proportionately.  The trouble is that they are 
also mostly exercised secretively, so complaint and redress is in most cases unobtainable.  Thus 
they have substituted an explicitly graduated framework of threat and response supervised by 
judges, for an infinitely malleable executive prerogative.  The irony is that this innovation was the 
grand achievement of bien-pensant civil liberties lawyers, who naively ignored how the 
government machine would implement their proposal. 
 
How are other European countries seeking to combat terrorism?  Has the EU sought to 
coordinate a European-wide approach? 
 
There was agreement reached on a Europe-wide arrest warrant, but for purposes much 
broader than terrorism (including "harmful" speech), and heavy pressure is being applied by the 
UK, France, Netherlands and Belgium to abolish existing protections.  In fact President Bush 
wrote to the President of the EU Commission requesting mandatory traffic data retention, which 
seemed odd since the US is not proposing comparable legislation of its own.  However, unlike 
EU citizens, US citizens do not have the safeguard of data protection legislation which prohibits 
blanket stockpiling of data for surveillance, nor the right to "subject-access" to discover what 
information is held about them by the private sector.  For example, major US telcos are rumoured 
never to have thrown away any call record since billing systems were unified in the mid-80s.  
How much data US ISPs keep is unknown and in most cases the customer has no contractual 
right to know. 
 
The Council of Europe (CoE) (an entirely separate entity from the EU), because it has zero 
transparency or public accountability, has been the international forum of choice for surveillance 
hawks.  The international criminal law of cyberspace was written by a dozen appointed "experts" 
working in secret for four years – we still don’t know their names.  Amongst other excessive 
powers, the CoE Convention on Cybercrime mandates a capability to stream highly sensitive 
traffic data across national boundaries in real-time, over-riding data protection and human rights 
due process. 
 
Could you briefly describe the European cyber-policy NGO scene?  Who are the key 
players?  How do they interact at the national, European and international levels? 
 
There are at least fifty different grass-roots European cyber-NGOs, almost none 
professionally staffed or funded, and the only co-ordination between them has been through 
GILC (the Global Internet Liberty Campaign), and APC (Association for Progressive 
Communications).  In France, the joke goes that if you want to start an NGO, then you'd better 
get the government to help you.  In Britain, old legalistic NGOs have a sclerotic conception of 
civil liberties which finds cyber-issues unintelligible.  Germany has a strong hacker-rights culture, 
but corresponding difficulties engaging with mainstream institutions. 
 
Is there a democratic deficit in European civil society tech policy?  How does this differ 
from the United States?  Are there any steps that are being taken, or should be taken, to reduce 
the democratic deficit? 
 
The democratic deficit is massive.  Some of the key NGO players have recognized this 
for a long time, but lacking the philanthropic resources common in the US, or the leverage to get 
core funding from the EU like the consumer lobby, several past attempts to bootstrap a coalition 
have atrophied.  Although there have been patchy successes at national level (e.g. ameliorating 
amendments to RIP), at the European level the result has been disastrous.  Law-enforcement 
agencies have had a clear field to dictate absurd wish-lists, unchallenged by independent expert 
scrutiny.  Such NGO representations as have been made to the EU Parliament and Commission 
have been ineffectual, ignored or misunderstood.  Much of the EU apparat are still hostile to 
NGOs, and that which is sympathetic is super-cautious. 
 
George Soros' OSI and the Markle Foundation providing early funding of East European cyber-
rights projects, but nothing for western Europe.  The assumption seemed to be that in mature 
liberal democracies, nothing really bad or stupid would happen.  Well, it has, and it's getting 
worse. 
 
Have European governments been successful in making Internet and information policy?  
Why or why not?   
 
The EU institutions really only "got" the Internet around 1998, having previously been 
wedded to an obsolete 80's notion of "telematics" (low-bandwidth smart networks operated by 
telcos).  Since then much hot-air has been ventilated at EU summits, but the machinery has such 
inertia that it always lags years behind.  A good example was the EU Commission attempt to push 
local-loop unbundling across Europe, which began to bite just as the dotcom crash blew away the 
rivals to the incumbents.  EU research programmes are underfunded and so bureaucratic that 
leading researchers simply don't apply, and the "deliverables" are usually a mediocre PowerPoint 
show aptly nick-named Euro-dreck. 
 
Is online banking secure?  How can customers protect themselves?  Are the initiatives 
being undertaken in the UK and the EU satisfactory?  Why or why not? 
 
The truth is that online banking has always been secure, relative to other risks - the main 
issue is regulatory not technical.  Banks lobbied hard but unsuccessfully to offload uncontrollable 
liabilities onto the customer.  Arguments about key-length were for a time a useful stick with 
which to beat export control and escrow policy, but now the game has moved on. 
 
Computers can never be made secure with software alone (for example a virus or bug could be 
used to steal your password or decryption key), but the risks are usually manageable.  But 
attempting to make all hardware secure begs the question "secure for whom"?  The industry is 
developing a specification for new PCs which could be interrogated remotely to establish whether 
the user's machine is "trustworthy", and refuse service otherwise.  Enormous power would be 
concentrated in a few levers of control, and this could tilt the market to a degree where the 
freedom to run any software you want will effectively be lost.  Such locked-down hardware could 
make outlandish copyright or surveillance laws enforceable (although it still could not stop 
terrorism).  That is why the Internet community in Europe is just astounded and horrified at 
Sen.Hollings' CBDTPA Bill.  The TrustedPC initiative has an extraordinarily naïve and limited 
conception of user privacy.  It is precisely the kind of architectural shift that Lawrence Lessig 
warns us could transform the Internet into a control freak's paradise, unless an entrenched 
democratic consensus to resist this develops.  But in the UK and I suspect also in the US, only 
about 1% of the legislature has ever programmed a computer, so these arguments are never 
articulated.  NGOs may have to hold the line for a generation before that changes. 
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